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5The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution
Genesis of this project
Dawn Oliver advocated the development of legislative standards in her article ‘Improving 
the Scrutiny of Bills: the Case for Standards and Checklists’ in Public Law in 2006.  Robert 
Hazell provided supporting arguments in two other articles in Public Law, ‘Who is the 
Guardian of Legal Values in the Legislative Process: Parliament or the Executive?’ (2004), 
and ‘Time for a new Convention: Parliamentary Scrutiny of Constitutional Bills’ (2006).
In 2013 these ideas were revived at a panel session on ‘Parliament and fundamental 
values’ at the Study of Parliament Group’s annual conference.  The panel was organised 
by Murray Hunt, Legal Adviser to the parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights.  
After the panel Robert Hazell suggested to Dawn Oliver that it was time to demonstrate 
that a set of legislative standards could be developed, and this project was born.  Jack 
Simson Caird has done the hard work of going through all the reports of the House of 
Lords Constitution Committee, extracting their standards and assembling them into 
coherent form.  
The study was kindly funded by Nat Le Roux, Director of the Constitution Society. We 
are	very	grateful	for	his	financial	support,	without	which	this	project	would	not	have	been	
possible. 
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1 D Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: the Case for Standards and Checklists’ (2006) Public Law 219-246.
2 D Oliver, ‘Improving the Scrutiny of Bills: the Case for Standards and Checklists’ (2006) Public Law 219-246 219. 
3 Royal Commission on the Reform of the House of Lords, A House for the Future (Cm 4534, 2000) para 5.22.
4 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001–
02, 11) para 1.
5 See J Simson Caird, ‘Parliamentary Constitutional Review: Ten Years of the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
Constitution’ [2012] Public Law 7, A Le Sueur and J Simson Caird ‘The House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution’ 
in A Horne, G Drewry and D Oliver (eds) ‘Parliament and the Law’ (Hart; 2013) 281-308 (check). 
Introduction
This	report	codifies	the	constitutional	standards	used	by	the	House	of	Lords	Select	
Committee on the Constitution (hereafter the Constitution Committee) in their reports 
published between 2001 and the end of the parliamentary session of 2012-2013. The 149 
reports are all listed in the Appendix.
In 2006 Dawn Oliver, professor of constitutional law at University College London, 
made the case for the use of standards and checklists within the legislative process in 
Westminster.1 Oliver argued that the adoption and use of a set of standards, along the 
lines of the one outlined in this report, by both Parliament and Government ‘would improve 
the quality of Bills presented to Parliament, enhance the capacity of Parliament to perform 
its scrutiny and consent-giving functions effectively, and thus improve the quality of the 
legislation Parliament passes’.2
This	codification	exercise	has	three	principal	goals.	The	first	is	to	draw	attention	to	the	
normative foundations of the work of the Constitution Committee. The Constitution 
Committee was established in 2001 following a recommendation of the Royal Commission 
on the reform of the House of Lords.3 The Committee’s formal terms of reference were set 
by the House of Lords Liaison Committee and have not changed since then: ‘to examine 
the constitutional implications of all public Bills coming before the House; and to keep 
under review the operation of the constitution’.4 The Constitution Committee has used 
this remit to establish itself as a key constitutional actor. It has done this by producing 
important investigative reports that contribute to current debates on the constitution, 
and by publishing reports on the constitutional implications of Government bills, some of 
which	have	proved	highly	influential.5	The	Committee’s	influence	and	status	derives	from	
its ability to articulate, interpret and develop the norms of the British constitution that are 
relevant to the scrutiny process. 
The code contained within this report aims to highlight how the Committee has developed 
constitutional	standards	that	relate	to	the	legislative	process.	The	standards	identified	
within this report concern both the content of legislation and the practice of the legislative 
process. In this sense, the code is intended to make the Committee’s constitutional 
interpretation more transparent.
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6 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001–
02, 11) para 21.
7 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001–
02, 11) para 23.
8 House of Lords Constitution Committee, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working (HL 2001–
02, 11) para 23.
9 The work of the Constitution Committee (32.12), the Joint Committee on Human Rights (11.31) and the work of the House 
of	Lords	Delegated	Powers	and	Regulatory	Reform	Committee	(15)	are	covered	by	the	Guide:	Cabinet	Office,	The Guide to 
Making Legislation (London: 2013) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/210917/
Guide_to_Making_Legislation_July_2013.pdf. 
In	its	first	report,	the	Committee	explained	that	it	defined	the	constitution	as	being	made	up	
of	five	main	tenets:	
Sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament•	
The Rule of Law, encompassing the rights of the individual•	
Union State•	
Representative Government•	
 Membership of the Commonwealth, the European Union, and other international •	
organisations.6
The Committee also explained that scrutiny would focus on those aspects of bills that 
raised	‘significant	constitutional	issues’.7	They	defined	a	constitutionally	significant	
issue to be ‘one that is a principal part of the constitutional framework and one that 
raises an important question of principle’.8 This provided a useful starting point. What 
is of particular interest is how, in practice, the Committee interprets the constitution. 
The	code	of	standards	below	reveals	how	the	five	tenets	and	definition	of	‘significant	
constitutional issues’ have been applied in the context of the legislative process and to the 
content of legislation. While it is important to recognise that the majority of the standards 
contained in the code were extracted from the Committee’s reports on particular bills, 
the	fact	that	many	of	the	standards	can	be	identified	in	multiple	reports	shows	that	the	
Committee has adopted a number of clear and consistent positions on the meaning of 
certain constitutional norms in the legislative context. By expounding the meaning of the 
constitution in this way the Committee has performed a vital service to constitutionalism 
in the United Kingdom: it has demonstrated the relevance of the normative content of the 
constitution to the lawmaking process. It is hoped that this code highlights this contribution.
The second goal of this exercise is to provide a potential resource for those involved in the 
legislative process. The code could be used within government. It could be referred to in the 
Cabinet	Office	‘Guide	to	Making	Legislation’,	to	inform	those	preparing	bills	of	the	standards	
likely to be raised by the Constitution Committee in the Lords.9 It could also be used by 
individual parliamentarians engaged in legislative scrutiny. Publication of a code that makes 
these standards more accessible to parliamentarians might prompt more of them to apply 
them in the course of  the analysis and scrutiny of a bill. The code could also be used by the 
Constitution Committee itself as a basis to develop their standards, which they could update 
annually. It is hard to think of a good reason for not making more use of soft law standards 
in	the	legislative	process.	They	are	not	binding,	and	so	they	fit	well	within	the	flexible	
nature and spirit of the constitution; and yet their interpretation and application, even in the 
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10 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation, First 
Report of Session 2013–14 (HC 85) p 3. 
11 Both the Hansard Society and the Better Government Initiative have argued that a code of legislative standards or a checklist 
would improve the quality of the legislative process: Ruth Fox and Matt Korris, Making Better Law: Reform of the legislative 
process from policy to Act (Hansard Society, 2010); Better Government Initiative, Good Government: Reforming Parliament 
and the Executive (2010).
12 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation, First 
Report of Session 2013–14 (HC 85) para 69. 
13 House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation: 
Government Response to the Committee’s First Report of Session 2013–14, First Special Report of Session 2013–14 (HC 
611) para 12.
context of disagreement over their meaning or importance, can serve to raise the issue of 
justification	for	the	proposed	provision	within	the	legislative	process.
The third goal of this exercise is to contribute to the debate on the development of 
a code of general legislative standards that was begun by the House of Commons 
Select Committee on Political and Constitutional Reform (hereafter the PCRC). In their 
report titled ‘Ensuring standards in the quality of legislation’, the PCRC recommends 
that ‘that there should be a Code of Legislative Standards for good quality legislation 
agreed between Parliament and the Government’ and that ‘a Joint Legislative Standards 
Committee with an oversight role should be created’.10 The report contains a Draft Code 
of Legislative Standards, which is said to draw together ‘existing practice and guidelines 
within Parliament and work already completed by groups such as the Hansard Society 
and Better Government Initiative, as well as academic writing and examples from 
other countries’.11 The report adds that their draft code should be used ‘as the basis for 
discussion and agreement between Parliament and the Government as to legislative 
standards’.12 The code included in this report demonstrates that the scrutiny work of the 
Constitution Committee is also relevant to that debate, and that in reality a set of legislative 
standards, based on the constitution, has already been developed within Parliament.
The Government’s response to the PCRC’s report, published in July 2013, indicates that a 
general code of legislative standards is not going to materialise: 
‘The Government does not believe that a Code of Legislative Standards is necessary 
or would be effective in ensuring quality legislation.’13
If we are not going to have a general code of legislative standards, it is up to Parliament 
and its committees to build on the PCRC’s proposal, and to develop other ways in which 
codes of standards can play a role in the legislative process. While Government support 
may be needed for a general code to be workable, there is nothing to prevent individual 
committees following the example of the PCRC and developing their own set of standards.
It	is	important	to	remember	that	the	code	is	not	supposed	to	represent	a	definitive	list	of	
constitutional or legislative norms, nor it is intended to be binding on any constitutional 
actor. The idea of the code is to provide a list of the constitutional standards that have 
been developed incrementally by the parliamentary committee that has responsibility 
for constitutional issues. It can provide a platform for debate and a resource for 
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participants in the legislative process. The standards within this code cannot resolve 
the key political questions that arise during the legislative process, but they can serve 
to provide a normative framework for some of those questions. The point of a soft-law 
code of standards is that, while a breach or departure from a standard is not necessarily 
undesirable,	it	should	be	acknowledged	and	justified	by	those	responsible.	
Methodology
Extracting the constitutional standards from the Constitution Committee’s reports is not a 
precise science. There is an unavoidable degree of subjectivity to the exercise. The basic 
methodology was to record every reference to a norm that related to either the content of 
legislation	or	the	legislative	process	itself.	The	first	sift	involved	reading	through	reports	
and recording every norm within each report. The result of this sift is included in the 
Appendix.
To produce the code, we categorised the norms catalogued in the initial sift under 
headings and then amalgamated some of the standards so as to avoid repetition. When 
two	or	more	standards	overlapped	to	a	significant	degree	they	were	collapsed	into	one	
standard and the relevant footnote contains all the references to the separate standards.
The main problem is that it is not always crystal clear when the Constitution Committee 
is referring to a standard. In general terms we have erred on the side of caution, and 
have tried to be as faithful as possible to the text of the report. As already mentioned, in 
the Committee’s scrutiny reports the Committee is not setting out general standards, but 
putting forward its view on a particular bill. We do not infer from these reports, and from 
their inclusion in our code that the Committee intended a point to be of general application. 
There is little doubt that if the Committee were to produce its own code based on its 
reports, it would take its own distinct approach.
The important thing to bear in mind is that the Committee is rarely categorical. It is rare 
for it to say legislation should not do x or legislation should do y. However, the Committee 
nonetheless draws attention to possible departures from constitutional principles, and in 
the	process	it	often	specifies	fairly	clear	standards.	It	is	these	that	we	have	attempted	to	
extract.
The footnotes to the Code list the sources as Report 1, etc.  The full references can be 
found in the Appendix, which numbers the Committee’s reports sequentially from 1 to 149.
10
The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution
14 Reports 7 and 56.
15 Report 77.
16 Report 147.
17 Report 7.
18 Report 7.
19 Report 7.
20 Report 77.
21 Report 85.
A Code of Constitutional Standards based 
on the reports of the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Constitution
1) The rule of law
1.1 Retrospective legislation
1.1.1  Enacting legislation with retrospective effect should be avoided.14
1.1.2  Provisions that have retrospective effect should be drafted as narrowly as possible.15
1.1.3  Individuals should not be punished or penalised for contravening what was at the 
time a valid legal requirement.16
1.1.4  Laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal 
liability of the citizen is at stake.17
1.1.5		Laws	should	not	deprive	someone	of	the	benefit	of	a	judgment	already	obtained.18
1.1.6  Laws should not prevent a court from deciding pending litigation according to 
its merits on the basis of the law in force at the time when the proceedings were 
commenced.19
1.1.7  Retrospective legislation should only be used when there is a compelling reason to 
do so.20
1.1.8  A legislative power to make a provision which has retrospective effect should be 
justified	on	the	basis	of	‘necessity’	and	not	of	‘desirability’.21
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22 Reports 64, 113 and 123.
23 Report 44.
24 Report 64.
25 Reports 12, 30 and 49.
26 Reports 41 and 145. 
27 Reports 51, 77, 93 and 130.
28 Reports 116 and 137.
29 Report 51.
30 Report 51.
31 Report 64. 
1.2 Legal certainty
1.2.1  The rule of law requires laws to be reasonably certain and accessible.22
1.2.2  General warrants should be avoided.23
1.2.3  Laws that include a variable monetary penalty should include an upper limit.24
2) Delegated powers, delegated legislation and Henry VIII clauses
2.1 Defining the power 
2.1.1  Delegations of legislative power should be framed as narrowly as possible.25
2.1.2  The policy aims of a Ministerial power should be included in the bill itself.26
2.1.3  The scope of a Henry VIII power should be limited to the minimum necessary to 
meet the pressing need for such an exceptional measure.27
2.1.4		The	use	of	Henry	VIII	powers	should	only	be	permitted	if	specific	purposes	are	
provided for in the Bill.28
2.1.5		Ministerial	powers	should	be	defined	objectively.29
2.1.6  Ministerial powers to make secondary legislation should be restricted by effective 
legal boundaries.30
2.2 Safeguards in delegation of legislative powers
2.2.1  Laws that contain delegated powers should strike a balance between the desire for 
effectiveness and the safeguards needed to ensure constitutional propriety.31
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32 Report 51. 
33 Reports 51, 77, 116, 137.
34 Report 138.
35 Report 64.
36 Report 25.
37 Reports 25, 39 and 51.
38 Report 51. 
39 Report 86. 
40 Report 90. 
41 Report 93.
42 Report 93. 
2.2.2  If constitutional safeguards can be added to a delegated ministerial legislative power 
without undermining the policy goals of a Bill then they should be included.32
2.2.3  Henry VIII powers should be accompanied by adequate procedural and legal 
safeguards.33
2.2.4  Henry VIII powers that relate to a constitutionally sensitive subject-matter should 
use	a	super-affirmative	parliamentary	procedure.34
2.2.5  Ministers should not be able to suspend legal powers by giving directions; instead 
orders, which are subject to parliamentary oversight, should be used.35
2.2.6  Provision should be made for Parliament to be informed promptly of all ministerial 
exercises of legislative power.36 
2.3 Appropriate uses of delegated powers
2.3.1  Henry VIII clauses should be limited so that they cannot be used to alter 
constitutional arrangements.37
2.3.2  Laws should not permit the sub-delegation of legislative powers.38
2.3.3  Delegating order-making powers to Ministers to change the statute book should 
be avoided when there are other more constitutionally appropriate alternatives 
available.39
2.3.4 Delegated legislation should not be used to create regulations that will have a major 
impact on the individual’s right to respect for private life.40
2.3.5   Delegated legislation should not be used to create new criminal offences.41
2.3.6   Bills should identify the provisions in other enactments that require amendment, 
rather than using Henry VIII powers to leave the power to make amendments to the 
subsequent discretion of the relevant department.42
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43 Reports 24 and 53.
44 Reports 137 and 144.
45 Report 49.
46 Report 27.
47 Reports 25, 27, 77, 137. 
48 Reports 51, 93, 130, 145.
49 Report 27. 
50 Reports 51, 77.
51 Report 56.
52 Report 73. 
2.3.7   The most important aspects of a policy should be included on the face of a bill and 
not left to be decided through delegated legislation.43
2.3.8			Rules	that	are	central	to	a	bill	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	to	the	greatest	
extent possible on the face of the bill, so allowing full legislative amendment and 
debate.44
2.3.9		Rights	of	appeal	should	be	defined	in	primary	legislation	and	not	in	secondary	
legislation.45
2.3.10	Delegations	of	legislative	authority	should	fit	within	the	overall	scheme	of	the	bill.46
2.4 The parliamentary justification of delegated powers, delegated legislation and 
Henry VIII powers
2.4.1		Ministers	should	provide	Parliament	with	their	justifications	for	proposing	the	
delegation of legislative powers.47 
2.4.2  Ministerial assurances as to the purpose of order-making powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill.48
2.4.3		Widely-drawn	delegations	of	legislative	authority	cannot	be	exclusively	justified	by	
the need for speed.49
2.4.4		The	justification	for	a	Henry	VIII	clause	should	refer	to	the	specific	purpose	that	it	is	
designed to serve.50
2.4.5  Where an “incidental and consequential” Henry VIII power is likely to be used in 
relation to constitutional legislation, the Government should provide a clear and 
detailed account to Parliament of how and why it intends to exercise that power.51
3) The separation of powers
3.1 The judiciary
3.1.1  The independence of the judiciary should not be undermined.52
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53 Report 21.
54 Report 137.
55 Report 60.
56 Report 73.
57 Report 73.
58 Reports 73 and 80. 
59 Report 83.
60 Reports 84 and 129.
61 Report 91.
62 Reports 128 and 132.
63 Report 138.
64 Report 138.
65 Report 138.
3.1.2  Judges’ security of tenure should be preserved.53
3.1.3  The politicisation of the judicial appointments process should be avoided.54
3.1.4  Ouster clauses should be avoided.55
3.1.5  The exercise of powers to combat terrorism should be subject to adequate judicial 
control.56
3.1.6		The	roles	of	Parliament	and	the	judiciary	should	not	be	conflated.57
3.1.7  If a government minister is to be made responsible for judiciary-related matters, then 
that minister should be the Lord Chancellor.58
3.1.8 Coercive powers that restrict a constitutional right should be exercised by the 
judiciary rather than the executive.59
3.1.9 The nature of the judicial oversight of a ministerial power should be clear on the face 
of the bill.60
3.1.10	Laws	should	avoid	creating	the	possibility	of	conflict	between	Parliament	and	the	
courts.61
3.1.11 A Minister’s legal accountability to the courts should not be fragmented.62
3.1.12 Interference with the courts’ ability to decide on the appropriate balance between 
the competing public interests of national security and the proper administration of 
justice should be avoided.63
3.1.13 Laws should not grant powers to the Secretary of State that unduly risk the fair 
administration of justice.64
3.1.14 Case management issues should be decided by the courts and not by Government 
ministers.65
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66 Report 49.
67 Report 57.
68 Report 81.
69 Report 92.
70 Report 92. 
71 Report 124.
72 Report 138. 
73 Report 83.
74 Report 83.
75 Report 72. 
76 Reports 72 and 73.
3.2 The Government 
3.2.1  Parliamentary debate and legislative authorisation should precede, not follow, the 
establishment of a public body.66
3.2.2  Public authorities established by Act of Parliament ought to derive their principal 
powers from express legal provisions.67
3.2.3  Government should not be granted legal authority in excess of the powers properly 
needed to implement a proposed policy.68
3.2.4  An independent system of regulation should be underpinned by laws that make 
provision to ensure its political neutrality.69
3.2.5  The decision-making powers of a public authority should be subject to the possibility 
of appeal to a different body.70
3.2.6  Laws should not jeopardise the operational independence of the police.71
3.2.7  The executive should not be allowed to have the dual role in civil proceedings of 
being a party to the litigation and at the same time being the sole “gatekeeper”, 
controlling access to the possibility that the litigation be conducted in a certain 
manner.72
3.2.8  Legislative sanction powers should not be administered by a private sector 
business.73
3.2.9 Ministerial assurances as to the use of administrative sanction powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill.74
3.2.10 Ministerial assurances are no substitute for a statutory sunset clause.75
3.2.11 Sunset clauses should be included when provisions are introduced for reasons of 
expediency in one Session ahead of a bill on the same subject that is forthcoming.76
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77 Reports 128 and 132.
78 Report 79. 
79 Report 116.
80 Report 48.
81 Report 36.
82 Reports 37 and 84. 
83 Report 91.
84 Report 49.
85 Report 51. 
86 Report 123.
87 Reports 36, 61, 73, 109 and 131.
3.2.12 Laws should not risk or impair the principle of individual ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament.77
3.2.13 Laws should respect the principle that the revenue affairs of individuals should be 
kept at arm’s length from ministers.78
3.3 Parliament
3.3.1 Laws should not impede effective parliamentary scrutiny.79
3.3.2  Laws should not add unnecessary complexity to the law-making process.80
3.3.3  The Government should not unduly restrict parliamentary deliberation.81
3.3.4  Omnibus Bills hinder legislative scrutiny and should be avoided.82
3.3.5  The principle of parliamentary privilege should be respected.83
3.3.6  It is not appropriate for Parliament to act unilaterally to reinterpret an international 
treaty to which the UK has become a party.84
3.3.7  Laws should not interfere with the principle that no person or body is recognised 
by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament	save	where	this	is	specifically	authorized	by	Act	of	Parliament.85
3.3.8  Legislation should respect the fundamental constitutional principle that no 
Parliament may bind its successors.86
4) Individual rights 
4.1 General principles
4.1.1  The restriction of individual rights should be proportionate.87
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88 Report 58.
89 Reports 58 and 129.
90 Report 58.
91 Report 61.
92 Reports 2, 57 and 131.
93 Report 66.
94 Report 73.
95 Report 64.
96 Report 64.
97 Report 72.
98 Report 83. 
4.1.2  Provisions that restrict the liberty of the individual should be drafted as narrowly as 
possible.88
4.1.3  Provisions that restrict the liberty of the individual should be accompanied by 
sufficient	limits	and	protections.89
4.1.4  Severe restrictions on the liberty of the subject should only be the result of a criminal 
conviction.90
4.1.5  Voluntary assurances should not be regarded as a satisfactory substitute for legally 
enforceable rights.91
4.2 Access to justice
4.2.1  Laws should respect the constitutional right of access to justice.92
4.2.2		A	statutory	power	granted	to	a	public	body	to	deprive	an	individual	of	a	significant	
right should be subject to a reference by the public body to a court.93
4.2.3  Laws should respect the constitutional principle that individual liberty is to be 
protected by the courts.94
4.3 Due process and procedural fairness
4.3.1  Laws that create a power to make administrative decisions that affect individuals 
should meet the minimum standards of procedural fairness.95
4.3.2  The common law principle of natural justice: audi alteram partem (hear both sides 
before making a decision) should be respected.96
4.3.3  The right to a fair trial should be respected.97
4.3.4  Laws that confer upon the executive coercive sanction powers should include 
safeguards for ensuring that fair procedures are followed and that there is an 
effective appeal to the courts to ensure judicial oversight.98
18
The Constitutional Standards of the House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution
99 Report 75.
100 Report 90.
101 Report 131. 
102 Reports 4 and 31 
103 Report 97. 
104 Report 31.
105 Report 31.
106 Report 31.
107 Report 31.
108 Reports 67, 71 and 104.
4.3.5  Laws that create a public decision-making process should ensure that affected 
citizens have recourse to an effective appeal system.99
4.3.6  Laws which impose restriction on the freedom of individuals backed by sanctions 
should include basic due process safeguards.100
4.3.7  Laws should respect the right of an individual detained in a police station to free 
legal advice.101
5) Parliamentary procedure
5.1 Pre-legislative scrutiny
5.1.1  Government Bills should be published in draft.102 
5.1.2  Draft Bills should represent a properly rounded set of proposals.103
5.1.3  When a Government Bill is not published in draft, the explanatory notes should set 
out the reasons.104
5.1.4  The Government should ensure that the full text of draft Bills is available to pre-
legislative scrutiny committees in good time before they are asked to report.105
5.1.5  Joint Committees should be set up at least two sitting weeks before a draft Bill is 
published and not be required to report until at least one month after the end of the 
consultation period. In the absence of a formal consultation exercise on the part of 
the Government, the minimum should be 4 months from publication of draft Bills.106
5.1.6		A	committee	considering	a	draft	Bill	should	be	supplied	with	the	findings	of	a	
consultation	exercise,	and	the	Government’s	response	to	those	findings	should	be	
made available to it.107
5.1.7  Draft Bills should be published in good time, and should allow at least twelve weeks 
for scrutiny at a minimum.108
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109 Report 82.
110 Report 82.
111 Report 104. 
112 Report 104.
113 Report 104.
114 Report 31.
115 Reports 31, 38 and 49.
116 Report 31.
117 Report 97.
5.1.8  Publication of draft Bills should be spread across the parliamentary year.109
5.1.9  The Government should issue a formal response to a committee report on a  
draft Bill.110
5.1.10 The Government should provide a written statement to the House when measures 
contained in a draft Bill are not pursued or where the provisions in a draft Bill are 
substantially amended or combined with other proposals in subsequent legislation.111
5.1.11 When a Government response to a committee report on draft legislation is delayed 
beyond two months, the Government should write to the Committee concerned to 
explain the delay.112 
5.1.12 If a draft Bill announced as part of the Government’s legislative programme is not 
subsequently brought forward, the Government should, by the end of the session, 
make a written statement to the House explaining the delay.113 
5.2 Explanatory Notes
5.2.1  The Explanatory Notes to each Bill should include, in the introductory section, 
a clear and developed explanation of the purpose of the Bill, incorporating or 
accompanied by the criteria by which the Bill, once enacted, can be judged to have 
met its purpose.114
5.2.2  Where a Bill amends an earlier Act, the effects of the Bill on the Act should be 
shown in an informal print of the amended Act and should be included in the 
Explanatory Notes to the Bill.115
5.2.3  The Explanatory Notes to all Bills introduced to give effect to EU obligations should 
carry a section detailing the scrutiny history of the measure.116
5.2.4		Explanatory	notes	to	a	Bill	should	draw	attention	to	significant	departures	from	the	
Draft Bill. 117
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118 Report 125.
119 Reports 36, 49, 51, 113, 116, 118 and 138.
120 Report 51.
121 Reports 61 and 126.
122 Reports 35, 51, 80, 81, 91, 117, 118, 140 and 144. 
5.3 Bills with constitutional implications
5.3.1  When the Government introduces a Bill it should provide a written ministerial 
statement which indicates whether, in each minister’s view, the Bill provides for 
significant	constitutional	change	and,	if	so:
 – what is the impact of the proposals upon the existing constitutional arrangements;
 – whether and, if so, how the Government engaged with the public in the initial 
development of the policy proposals and what was the outcome of that public 
engagement;
 – in what way were the detailed policies contained in the Bill subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny in the Cabinet committee system;
 – whether a green paper was published, what consultation took place on the 
proposals, including with the devolved institutions, and the extent to which the 
Government agree or disagree with the responses given;
 – whether a white paper was published and whether pre-legislative scrutiny was 
undertaken and the extent to which the Government agree or disagree with the 
outcome of that process;
	 –	what	is	the	justification	for	any	referendum	held,	or	to	be	held,	on	the	proposals;	
 – and when and how the legislation, if passed, will be subject to post-legislative 
scrutiny.118
5.3.2		The	Government	should	provide	Parliament	with	its	justification	for	the	constitutional	
implications of legislation when it introduces a Bill.119
5.3.3		The	committee	stage	of	Bills	of	first	class	constitutional	importance	should	be	taken	
on	the	floor	of	the	House	of	Commons.120
5.3.4  The process of enacting Bills of constitutional importance should meet the 
requirements of caution and proportionality.121
5.3.5		Bills	that	contain	issues	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	published	by	the	
Government in draft and subject to pre-legislative scrutiny.122
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123 Reports 80, 91, 107, 140 and 146.
124 Report 107.
125 Report 107. 
126 Report 123.
127 Report 146.
128 Report 143. 
129 Report 143.
130 Report 147.
131 Reports 89 and 101.
5.3.6		Significant	constitutional	legislation	should	be	subject	to	full	scrutiny	by	both	Houses	
of	Parliament,	and	should	not	be	fast-tracked,	unless	there	are	justifiable	reasons	
for fast-tracking them.123
5.3.7  The Government should not introduce substantially new clauses to a constitutionally 
significant	Bill	if	there	is	not	enough	time	to	scrutinise	them	adequately	in	both	
Houses of Parliament.124
5.3.8		Bills	of	major	constitutional	significance	should	not	find	their	way	onto	the	statute	
book via the ‘wash-up’.125
5.3.9  Referendums should only be used to decide fundamental constitutional issues.126
5.4 Fast-track legislation 
5.4.1  The fast-tracking of normal parliamentary procedure should only occur when strictly 
necessary.127
5.4.2  Fast-track legislation should not be used by government to address legal issues that 
have been known about for a long time.128
5.4.3  Fast-track legislation should be made available to Parliament’s legislative scrutiny 
committees at the earliest possible opportunity, even while the legislation remains in 
draft form.129
5.4.4  Fast-track legislation should not be used to overturn a court judgment 
retrospectively in order to deprive an individual of a right.130
5.4.5  The Minister responsible for a fast-tracked Bill should be required to make an oral 
statement to the House of Lords outlining the case for fast-tracking.131
5.4.6  The Minister responsible for a fast-tracked Bill should be required to issue a written 
memorandum which addresses the following points: 
 (a) Why is fast-tracking necessary?
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132 Reports 89, 126, 143, 146.
133 Report 89.
134 Report 89.
135 Report 147.
136 Reports 97 and 125.
	 (b)	What	is	the	justification	for	fast-tracking	each	element	of	the	Bill?
 (c) What efforts have been made to ensure the amount of time made available for 
parliamentary scrutiny has been maximised?
 (d) To what extent have interested parties and outside groups been given an 
opportunity	to	influence	the	policy	proposal?
 (e) Does the Bill include a sunset clause (as well as any appropriate renewal 
procedure)? If not, why do the Government judge that their inclusion is not 
appropriate?
 (f) Are mechanisms for effective post-legislative scrutiny and review in place? If not, 
why do the Government judge that their inclusion is not appropriate?
	 (g)	Has	an	assessment	been	made	as	to	whether	existing	legislation	is	sufficient	to	
deal with any or all of the issues in question?
 (h) Have relevant parliamentary committees been given the opportunity to scrutinise 
the legislation?132
5.4.7  When a Bill is fast-tracked there should be a presumption in favour of the inclusion 
of a sunset clause.133
5.4.8  When a Bill is fast-tracked it should be subject to post-legislative review within a 
maximum of two years post-enactment.134
5.4.9  Fast-track legislation should not be used to retrospectively overturn a court 
judgment where there is no compelling operational requirement to amend the law 
retrospectively.135
5.5 Responding to a committee’s report
5.5.1  If the Constitution Committee reports on a Bill before second reading, the 
Government should respond before the commencement of the committee stage.136
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137 Report 89.
138 Report 124. 
139 Report 138. 
5.6 Amendments
5.6.1  The late tabling of amendments should be minimised.137
5.7 Post-legislative scrutiny
5.7.1  The Government should explain their position on post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill 
prior to its enactment.138
5.7.2  Constitutional legislation should be subject to comprehensive post-legislative 
scrutiny.139
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Appendix: List of the Reports of the House of 
Lords Select Committee on the Constitution 
2001-02 to 2012-13
1.  2001-2002
1.  First Report: Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of 
Working (First Report) (HL Paper 11)
 None.
2.  Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill (Second Report) (HL Paper 41) 
Provision should be made for prompt access to a court or tribunal for the resolution 
of disputes between individuals and the state and disputes between individuals 
(Appendix). 
3.  Sex Discrimination (Election Candidates) Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 41)
 None.
4.  Changing the Constitution: The Process of Constitutional Change (Fourth Report) 
(HL Paper 69)
 Government bills should be published in draft (para 40).
5.  Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 42)
 None.
6.  Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 95) 
None.
7.  Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill Further Report (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 
129) 
Laws should not have retrospective effect (paras 6- 8).
 Laws should not retrospectively interfere with obligations when the liberty or criminal 
liability of the citizen is at stake (para 7).
 Legislation should respect the principle of legal certainty (para 9).
	 Laws	should	not	deprive	someone	of	the	benefit	of	a	judgment	already	obtained	
(para 10).
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 Laws should not prevent a court deciding pending litigation according to its merits 
on the basis of the law in force at the time when the proceedings were commenced 
(para 11).
2. 2002-2003
8.  Crime (International Co-operation) Bill [HL] (First Report) (HL Paper 27) 
None.
9.  Devolution: Inter-Institutional Relations in the United Kingdom (Second Report) (HL 
Paper 28) 
None. 
10.  Courts Bill [HL] (Third Report) (HL Paper 38) 
None
11.  Regional Assemblies (Preparations) Bill (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 56) 
None. 
12.  European Parliament (Representation) Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 65) 
Powers to make subordinate legislation should be drawn as narrowly as practicable 
(para 4).
13.  Extradition Bill (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 82) 
None. 
14.  Criminal Justice Bill (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 129) 
None.
15.  Health and Social Care (Community Health and Standards) Bill (Eighth Report) (HL 
Paper 156) 
None. 
16.  The Draft Constitutional Treaty for the European Union (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 
168)  
None.
17.  Meeting with the Lord Chancellor (Tenth Report) (HL Paper 180) 
None. 
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3. 2003-2004
18.  European Parliamentary and Local Elections (Pilots) Bill (First Report)  
(HL Paper 16)  
None.
19  Annual Report (2002-2003) (Second Report) (HL Paper 19)  
None. 
20.  Planning and Compulsory Purchase Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 27) 
None.
21.  Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 40) 
Judges’ security of tenure should be preserved (Appendix 1).
22.  Companies (Audit, Investigation and Community Enterprise) Bill (Fifth Report) (HL 
Paper 53)  
None.
23.  The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 68) 
None.
24.  Gangmasters (Licensing) Bill (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 108) 
The main objectives of a legislative scheme should be apparent from the face of a 
Bill and should not be left to secondary legislation (paras 4-8).
25.  Civil Contingencies Bill (Eight Report) (HL paper 114) 
Henry	VIII	clauses	must	be	clearly	justified	(para	7).	
 Provision should be made for Parliament to be informed promptly of all ministerial 
exercises of legislative power (para 12)
 Henry VIII clauses should be drafted so that they cannot be used to amend 
constitutional enactments (paras 13-15).
26.  Children Bill (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 123) 
None.
27.  Age-Related Payments Bill (Tenth Report) (HL Paper 124)
	 Delegations	of	legislative	authority	should	be	justified	(para	10).
	 Delegations	of	legislative	authority	should	be	narrowly	defined	(para	10).
	 Delegations	of	legislative	authority	should	fit	within	the	overall	scheme	of	a	Bill	 
(para 9). 
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28.  Constitutional Reform Bill (Eleventh Report) (HL paper 142)
 None.
29.  The Regulatory State: Ensuring its Accountability (Twelfth Report) (HL Paper 150)
 None.
30.  Age-Related Payments Act (Thirteenth Report) (HL Paper 172)
	 Widely-drawn	delegations	of	legislative	authority	cannot	be	exclusively	justified	by	
the need for speed (para 6).
31.  Parliament and the Legislative Process (Fourteenth Report) (HL Paper 178) 
Government bills should be published in draft (para 34).
 When a Government bill is not published in draft, the explanatory notes should set 
out the reasons to explain the reasons behind the decision (para 34).
 The Government should ensure that the full text of draft Bills is available to pre-
legislative scrutiny committees in good time before they are asked to report (para 
63).
 Joint Committees should be set up at least two sitting weeks before a draft bill is 
published and not be required to report until at least one month after the end of the 
consultation period. In the absence of a formal consultation exercise on the part 
of the Government, the minimum should be 4 months from publication of draft bills 
(para 69).
 A committee	considering	a	draft	bill	should	be	supplied	with	the	findings	of	a	
consultation	exercise,	and	the	Government’s	response	to	those	findings	should	be	
made available to it (para 71).
 The Explanatory Notes to each bill should include, in the introductory section, 
a clear and developed explanation of the purpose of the bill, incorporating or 
accompanied by the criteria by which the bill, once enacted, can be judged to have 
met its purpose (para 87).
 Where a bill amends an earlier Act, the effects of the bill on the Act should be shown 
in an informal print of the amended Act and should be included in the Explanatory 
Notes to the bill (para 98).
 The Explanatory Notes to all bills introduced to give effect to EU obligations should 
carry a section detailing the scrutiny history of the measure (para 103).
32.  Devolution: Its Effect on the Practice of Legislation at Westminster (Fifteenth Report) 
(HL Paper 192) 
None.
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33.  Meeting with the Lord Chancellor (Sixteenth Report) (HL Paper 193) 
None.
34.  Annual Report 2003-04 (Seventeenth Report) (HL Paper 194) 
None.
4. 2004-2005
35.  Inquiries Bill (First Report) (HL Paper 21)  
Bills	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	subject	to	pre-legislative	scrutiny	
(Appendix 1).
36.  Prevention of Terrorism Bill (Second Report) (HL Paper 66) 
The Government should not unduly restrict parliamentary deliberation (para 13). 
	 Provisions	of	constitutional	significance	that	make	far-reaching	inroads	into	the	
liberties	of	the	individual	must	be	strongly	justified	(para	15).
37.  Serious Organised Crime and Police Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 65) 
Legislative proposals which command political consensus should not be used as 
a vehicle for legislating on more contentious matters that should be the subject of 
separate legislation (para 2).
38.  First Progress Report 2004-05 (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 78) 
When legislation makes extensive amendments to previous legislation the 
Government should take steps, such as publishing a Keeling style Bill, to make the 
legislation comprehensible (para 4). 
39.  Identity Cards Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 82) 
Significant	changes	to	the	relationship	between	the	State	and	the	individual	should	
not be brought about by secondary legislation (para 12). 
40.  Parliament and the Legislative Process: The Government’s Response (Sixth Report) 
(HL Paper 114) 
None.
5. 2005-2006
41.  First Progress Report 2005-06 (First Report) (HL Paper 30) 
The policy aims of a Ministerial power should be included in the Bill itself (para 6).
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42.  Second Progress Report 2005-06 (Second Report) (HL Paper 47) 
None.
43.  Identity Cards Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 44) 
Significant	changes	to	the	relationship	between	the	State	and	the	individual	should	
not be brought about by secondary legislation (para 9).
44.  Terrorism Bill (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 82) 
General warrants should be avoided (para 4).
 Legislative provisions that are only needed for a limited time should include sunset 
clauses the provision for regular post-legislative scrutiny (para 5).
 The restriction of individual rights should be proportionate (para 6).
45.  Constitutional Reform Act 2005 (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 83) 
None.
46.  Meeting with the Lord Chancellor (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 84) 
None.
47.  Constitutional aspects of the challenge to the Hunting Act 2004 (Seventh Report) 
(HL Paper 141) 
None. 
48.  Government of Wales Bill (Eighth Report) (HL Paper 142) 
Laws should not add unnecessary complexity to the law-making process (para 31).
49.  Third Progress Report (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 151) 
When legislation makes extensive amendments to previous legislation the 
Government should take steps, such as publishing a Keeling version of the Bill, to 
make the legislation easier to comprehend (para 4). 
 Rights of appeal should be set out in primary and not secondary legislation (para 
9-10). 
	 There	needs	to	be	a	strong	justification	for	legislation	that	proposes	to	restrict	an	
individual’s  rights of appeal (Appendix 3 – para 4).
 It is not appropriate for Parliament to act unilaterally to reinterpret an international 
treaty to which the UK has become a party (Appendix 3 – para 8).
 Parliamentary debate and legislative authorisation should precede, not follow, the 
establishment of a public body (Appendix 4).
 Delegations of legislative power should be framed as narrowly as possible 
(Appendix 5 – para 3). 
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50.  Government Response to a report on the Government of Wales Bill (Tenth Report) 
(HL Paper 168) 
None.
51.  Legislative and Regulatory Reform Bill (Eleventh Report) (HL Paper 194) 
Bills	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	published	in	draft	(para	1).
 Ministerial powers to make secondary legislation should be restricted by effective 
legal boundaries (para 8).
	 The	committee	stage	of	Bills	of	first	class	constitutional	importance	should	be	taken	
on	the	floor	of	the	House	of	Commons	(para	19).
	 The	government	should	provide	Parliament	with	its	justification	for	the	constitutional	
implications of legislation when it introduces a Bill (para 21).
 Ministerial assurances as to the purpose of order-making powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill (para 23).
 Laws should not interfere with the principle that no person or body is recognised 
by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of 
Parliament (para 32).
 Henry VIII powers should be accompanied by adequate procedural and legal 
safeguards (para 35).
	 The	justification	for	a	Henry	VIII	clause	should	refer	to	the	specific	purpose	that	it	is	
designed to serve (para 35).
	 The	purpose	of	a	Henry	VIII	clause	should	be	defined	in	the	Bill	as	narrowly	as	
possible (para 36).
 If constitutional safeguards can be added without undermining the policy goals of a 
Bill then they should included (para 45).
 Henry VIII clauses should be limited so that they cannot be used to alter 
constitutional arrangements (para 52). 
	 Ministerial	powers	should	be	defined	objectively	(para	60).
 Laws should not permit the sub-delegation of legislative powers (para 61).
 Order making powers should be restricted so that they do not allow the amendment 
of primary legislation that is less than two years old (para 62). 
52.  Police and Justice Bill (Twelfth Report) (HL Paper 195) 
None.
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53.  Armed Forces Bill (Thirteenth Report) (HL Paper 200)
 The most important aspects of a policy should be included in the face of a Bill and 
not left to be decided through delegated legislation (para 5).
54.  Meeting with the Lord Chief Justice (Fourteenth Report) (HL Paper 213) 
None.
55.  Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility (Fifteenth Report) (HL Paper 236) 
None.
56.  Final Progress Report 2005–06 (Sixteenth Report) (HL Paper 255) 
Laws should not have retrospective effect (para 4). 
 Where an “incidental and consequential” Henry VIII power is likely to be used in 
relation to constitutional legislation, there is a need for a clear and detailed account 
of how and why the Government intends to exercise that power (Appendix 5).
6. 2006-2007
57.  Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Bill (First Report) (HL Paper 13)  
Public authorities established by Act of Parliament ought to derive their principal 
powers from express legal provisions (para 12).
 Laws should not interfere with the constitutional principle of access to justice (paras 
14-16).
58.  Serious Crime Bill (Second Report) (HL Paper 41) 
Provisions that restrict the liberty of the individual should be drafted as narrowly as 
possible (para 12).
 Provisions that restrict the liberty of the individual should be accompanied by 
sufficient	limits	and	protections	(para	14).	
 Severe restrictions on the liberty of the subject should be the result of a criminal 
conviction (para 17).
59.  Waging war: Parliament’s role and responsibility Follow-up (Third Report)  
(HL Paper 51) 
None.
60.  Justice and Security (Northern Ireland ) Bill (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 54) 
Ouster clauses should be avoided (para 2).
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61.  Freedom of Information (Amendment) Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 127) 
The process of enacting Bills of constitutional importance should meet the 
requirements of caution and proportionality (para 4).
 Voluntary assurances should not be regarded as a satisfactory substitute for legally 
enforceable rights (para 8).
 Restrictions on the right to access information should be narrowly drawn and 
proportionate (paras 12-14).
62.  Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament (Sixth Report) (HL 
Paper 151) 
None.
63.  The Governance of Britain (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 158) 
None.
7. 2007-2008
64.  Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Bill (First Report) (HL Paper 16) 
Laws should strike a balance between the desire for effectiveness and the 
safeguards needed to ensure constitutional propriety (para 2). 
 Laws should be reasonably certain and accessible (para 6).
 Ministers should not be able to suspend legal powers by giving directions; instead 
orders, which are subject to parliamentary oversight, should be used (para 6). 
 Laws that creates a power to make administrative decisions should meet the 
minimum standards of procedural fairness (para 11).
 The common law principle of natural justice: audi alteram partem (hear both sides 
before making a decision) should be respected (para 11).
 Laws that creates a variable monetary penalty should include an upper limit (para 
12).
65.  Scrutiny of Welsh Legislative Competence Orders (Second Report) (HL Paper 17) 
None.
66.  Child Maintenance and Other Payments Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 27) 
A	statutory	power	granted	to	a	public	body	to	deprive	an	individual	of	a	significant	
right should be subject to a reference by the public body to a court (para 10).
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67.  Pre-Legislative Scrutiny in the 2006–07 Session (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 43) 
Draft bills should be published in good time, and should allow at least twelve weeks 
for scrutiny at a minimum (para 21).
68.  Annual Report 2006-07 (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 44) 
None.
69.  European Union (Amendment) Bill and the Lisbon Treaty: Implications for the UK 
Constitution (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 84) 
None.
70.  Reform of the Office of Attorney General (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 93) 
None.
71.  Pre-Legislative Scrutiny in the 2006-07 Session: Follow-up (Eighth Report) (HL 
Paper 129) 
Draft bills should be published in good time, and should allow at least twelve weeks 
for scrutiny at a minimum (para 2).
72.  Criminal Evidence (Witness Anonymity) Bill (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 147) 
The right to a fair trial should be respected (para 12).
 Ministerial assurances are no substitute for a statutory sunset clause (para 20).
 Sunset clauses should be included when provisions are introduced for reasons 
of expediency in one Session ahead of a bill on the same subject that has been 
announced as part of the Draft Legislative Programme for a subsequent Session 
(para 23).
73.  Counter-Terrorism Bill: The Role of Ministers, Parliament and the Judiciary (Tenth 
Report) (HL Paper 167)
 Laws relating to the principles of security and individual liberty should be framed 
proportionately (para 5). 
 The exercise of powers to combat terrorism should be subject to adequate judicial 
control (para 5).
 Laws should respect the basic constitutional principle that individual liberty is to be 
protected by the courts (para 22). 
 The independence of the judiciary should not be undermined (para 38).
	 The	roles	of	Parliament	and	the	judiciary	should	not	be	conflated	(para	39).	
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 Sunset clauses should be included when provisions are introduced for reasons of 
expediency in one Session ahead of a bill on the same subject that is forthcoming 
(para 49).
	 Powers	to	dismiss	judicial	officers	should	be	conferred	on	the	Lord	Chancellor	rather	
than upon a Secretary of State (para 57). 
74.  Relations between the executive, the judiciary and Parliament: Follow-up Report 
(Eleventh Report) (HL Paper 177) 
None. 
8. 2008-2009
75.  Marine and Coastal Access Bill (First Report) (HL Paper 13) 
Laws that create a public decision-making process should ensure that citizens have 
recourse to an effective appeal system (para 13). 
76.  Surveillance: Citizens and the State (Second Report) ( HL Paper 18) 
None.
77.  Banking Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 19) 
	Henry	VIII	powers	should	only	be	enacted	when	there	is	a	compelling	justification	
(para 3). 
 The scope of a Henry VIII power should be limited to the minimum necessary to 
meet the pressing need for such an exceptional measure (para 3). 
 Henry VIII powers should be subject to parliamentary control (para 3).
	 Henry	VIII	powers	cannot	be	justified	simply	by	reference	to	a	desire	to	make	the	
legislative	regime	in	question	‘effective’,	instead	they	should	be	justified	by	reference	
to the particular context of the Bill in question (para 5).
 Retrospective legislation should only be used when there is compelling reason to do 
so (para 7). 
 Provisions that have retrospective effect should be drafted as narrowly as possible 
(para 7).
78.  Annual Report 2007-08 (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 20) 
None.
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79.  Part 1 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 41) 
Laws should respect the principle that the revenue affairs of individuals should be 
kept at arm’s length from ministers (para 2). 
80.  Northern Ireland Bill (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 50) 
Bills	that	deal	with	issues	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	published	in	draft	
and subject to pre-legislative scrutiny (para 3).
	 Bills	that	deal	with	issues	of	constitutional	significance	should	not	be	put	on	a	fast-
track legislative process in the House of Commons and the House of Lords (para 9).
 If a government minister is to be made responsible for judiciary-related matters, then 
that minister should be the Lord Chancellor (para 14).
81.  Part 3 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Bill (Seventh Report)  
(HL Paper 54) 
Bills with constitutional implications should be preceded by effective consultation 
(para 16).
 Government should not be granted legal authority in excess of the powers properly 
needed to implement a proposed policy (para 20).
82.  Pre-Legislative Scrutiny in the 2007-08 Session (Eighth Report) (HL paper 66) 
Publication of draft bills should be spread across the parliamentary year (para 23).
 The Government should issue a formal response to a committee report on a draft 
bill (para 31-32).
83.  Welfare Reform Bill (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 79) 
Laws that confers upon the executive powers coercive sanction powers should 
include measures to establish safeguards for ensuring that fair procedures are 
followed and that there is an effective appeal to the courts to ensure judicial 
oversight (para 9).
 Coercive powers that restrict a constitutional right should be exercised by the 
judiciary rather than the executive (para 10). 
 Ministerial assurances as to the use of administrative sanction powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill (para 11).
 Legislative sanction powers should not be administered by a private sector business 
(para 12).
84.  Coroners and Justice Bill (Tenth Report) (HL Paper 96) 
Omnibus Bills hinder legislative scrutiny and should be avoided (para 2).
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 The nature of the judicial oversight of a ministerial power should be clear on the face 
of the bill (para 9).
85.  Banking Act 2009: Supplementary report on retrospective legislation (Eleventh 
Report) (HL Paper 97) 
A legislative power to make a provision which has retrospective effect should only 
invoked on the basis of ‘necessity’ and not of ‘desirability’ (para 10).
86.  Law Commission Bill (Twelfth Report) (HL Paper 103) 
Delegating order-making powers to Ministers to change the statute book should be 
avoided when there are other more constitutionally appropriate alternative available 
(para 2). 
87.  The National Assembly for Wales (Legislative Competence) (Social Welfare) Order 
2009 (relating to Carers) (Thirteenth Report) (HL Paper 105) 
None. 
88.  Analysis of the Government’s response to Surveillance: Citizens and the State 
(Fourteenth Report) (HL Paper 114)  
None.
89.  Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional Implications and Safeguards (Fifteen Report) 
(HL Paper 116) 
The late tabling of amendments should be minimised (para 106).
 The Minister responsible for a fast-tracked bill should be required to make an oral 
statement to the House of Lords outlining the case for fast-tracking (para 184).
 The Minister responsible for a fast-tracked bill should be required to issue a written 
memorandum which address the following points: 
 (a) Why is fast-tracking necessary?
	 (b)	What	is	the	justification	for	fast-tracking	each	element	of	the	bill?
 (c) What efforts have been made to ensure the amount of time made available for 
parliamentary scrutiny has been maximised?
 (d) To what extent have interested parties and outside groups been given an 
opportunity	to	influence	the	policy	proposal?
 (e) Does the bill include a sunset clause (as well as any appropriate renewal 
procedure)? If not, why do the Government judge that their inclusion is not 
appropriate?
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 (f) Are mechanisms for effective post-legislative scrutiny and review in place? If not, 
why do the Government judge that their inclusion is not appropriate?
	 (g)	Has	an	assessment	been	made	as	to	whether	existing	legislation	is	sufficient	to	
deal with any or all of the issues in question?
 (h) Have relevant parliamentary committees been given the opportunity to scrutinise 
the legislation (para 186)?
 When a Bill is fast-tracked there should be a presumption in favour of the inclusion 
of a sunset clause (para 198).
 When a Bill is fast-tracked it should be subject to post-legislative review within a 
maximum of two years post-enactment (para 209).
90.  Policing and Crime Bill (Sixteenth Report) (HL Paper 128) 
Laws which impose restriction on the freedom of individuals backed by sanctions 
should include basic due process safeguards (paras 6-9).
 Delegated legislation should not be used to create regulations that will have a major 
impact on the individual’s right to respect for private life (paras 11-15)
91.  Parliamentary Standards Bill (Seventeenth Report) (HL Paper 130) 
Bills	of	constitutional	significance	should	not	be	fast-tracked	through	Parliament	
(para 1).
	 Bills	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	subject	to	pre-legislative	scrutiny	 
(para 21).
	 Bills	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	subject	to	public	consultation	(para	21).	
92.  Parliamentary Standards Bill: implications for Parliament and the courts (Eighteenth 
Report) (HL Paper 134) 
An independent system of regulation should be underpinned by laws that make 
provision to ensure its political neutrality (paras 7-10).
	 Laws	should	avoid	creating	the	possibility	of	conflict	between	Parliament	and	the	
courts (para 22). 
 The decision-making powers of a public authority should be subject to the possibility 
of appeal to a different body (para 34). 
 The principle of parliamentary privilege should be respected (para 41).
93.  Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Bill (Nineteenth 
Report) (HL Paper 158)
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 Ministerial assurances as to the purpose of order-making powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill (para 12).
 Delegated legislation should not be used to create new criminal offences (para 14).
 Henry VIII clauses should be drafted as narrowly as is practicable (para 20).
 Bills should identify which provisions in other enactments which require amendment 
rather than using Henry VIII powers to leave the power to make amendments to the 
subsequent discretion of the relevant department (para 21).
94.  The Proposed National Assembly for Wales (Legislative Competence) 
(Environment) Order 2009 (Twentieth Report) (HL Paper 159) 
None. 
95.  Government Response to a report on Pre-legislative Scrutiny in the 2007–08 
session (Twenty-first	Report)	(HL	Paper	160) 
None.
96.  Parliamentary Standards Bill & Policing and Crime Bill: Government Responses to 
the Committee’s 17th, 18th and 16th Reports of Session 2008-09 (Twenty-second 
Report) (HL Paper 173) 
None. 
9. 2009-2010
97.  Clause 12 of the Bribery Bill (First Report) (HL Paper 10) 
None.
98.  Government Response to Fast-Track Legislation: Constitutional Implications and 
Safeguards (Second Report) (HL Paper 11)  
None.
99.  Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Bill (Third Report) 
(HL Paper 17) 
None.
100.  The Cabinet Office and the Centre of Government (Fourth Report) (HL Paper 30)  
None. 
101.  Video Recordings Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 36) 
The	reasons	for	fast-tracking	legislation	should	be	fully	justified	and	explained	to	
Parliament by government (paras 1-9).
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102.  Clause 17 of the Digital Economy Bill (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 40)  
Henry VIII powers should only be included when it can be shown that they are 
necessary (paras 3-4). 
103.  Clause 12 of the Bribery Bill: Further Report (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 49) 
Legislation	that	creates	statutory	defences	to	criminal	offences	specific	to	the	
executive should be subject to an authorisation procedure (para 11).
 Draft Bills should represent a properly rounded set of proposals (para 12). 
	 Explanatory	notes	to	a	Bill	should	draw	attention	to	significant	departures	from	the	
Draft Bill (para 13). 
 The Government should respond to the Committee’s reports in timely fashion (para 
14).
104.  Pre-Legislative Scrutiny in the 2008-09 and 2009-10 Sessions (Eighth Report) (HL 
Paper 78) 
Parliamentary committees should have a minimum of twelve weeks to report on a 
draft bill (para 16).
 The Government should provide a written statement to the House when measures 
contained in a draft bill are not pursued or where the provisions in a draft bill are 
substantially amended or combined with other proposals in subsequent legislation 
(para 28). 
 When a Government response to a committee report on draft legislation is delayed 
beyond two months, the Government should write to the Committee concerned to 
explain the delay (para 29). 
 If a draft bill announced as part of the Government’s legislative programme is not 
subsequently brought forward, the Government should, by the end of the session, 
make a written statement to the House explaining the delay (para 30). 
105.  Annual Report 2008-2009 (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 79) 
None.
106.  Meeting with the Lord Chancellor (Tenth Report) (HL Paper 80)  
None. 
107.  Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill (Eleventh Report) (HL Paper 98) 
Significant	constitutional	legislation	should	be	subject	to	full	scrutiny	by	both	Houses	
of Parliament (para 40).
 The government should not introduce substantially new clauses to a constitutionally 
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significant	Bill	if	there	is	not	enough	time	to	adequately	scrutinise	them	in	both	
Houses of Parliament (para 45). 
	 Bills	of	major	constitutional	significance	should	not	find	their	way	onto	to	statute	
book via the ‘wash-up’ (para 43).
108.  Referendums in the United Kingdom (Twelfth Report) (HL Paper 99)  
None.
109.  Crime and Security Bill (Thirteenth Report) (HL Paper 107) 
Restrictions upon an individual’s right to respect for private life should be 
proportionate (para 5).
110.  Bribery Bill and Constitutional Reform and Governance Bill: Government Reponses 
to the Committee’s 7th and 11th Reports of Session 2009-10 (Fourteenth Report) (HL 
Paper 109) 
None. 
111.  Meeting with the Chairman of the House of Lords Appointments Commission 
(Fifteenth Report) (HL Paper 109) 
None.
10. 2010-2012
112.  Government Response to the report on the Cabinet Office and the Centre of 
Government (First Report) (HL Paper 14) 
None. 
113.  Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill (Second Report) (HL Paper 25) 
Laws should not be unnecessarily complex (para 10). 
 Legislation that departs from the constitutional principle of legal certainty should be 
carefully explained (para 11).
114.  Sessional Report 2009-10 (Third Report) (HL Paper 26)  
None.
115.  Government Response to the report on Referendums in the United Kingdom (Fourth 
Report) (HL Paper 34) 
None.
116.   The Government’s Constitutional Reform Programme (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 43)  
None.
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117.  Public Bodies Bill (Sixth Report) (HL Paper 51) 
Henry VIII powers	must	be	clearly	limited,	exercisable	only	for	specific	purposes,	
and subject to adequate parliamentary oversight (para 5).
 Laws should not impede effective parliamentary scrutiny (para 6).
 Legislation should only depart from constitutional principles where a full and clear 
explanation	and	justification	is	provided	by	government	to	Parliament	(para	6).
118.  Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 
58) 
Bills that propose major constitutional reform should be subject to prior public 
consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny (para 12).
 Referendums should only be used to decided fundamental constitutional issues 
(para 16).
119.  Fixed-term Parliaments Bill (Eighth Report) (HL Paper 69) 
The Government should explain in clear terms how constitutional reform proposals 
within a Bill relate to constitutional principles (para 167).
	 Save	where	there	are	justifiable	reasons	for	acting	more	quickly,	the	proper	way	
to introduce a constitutional reform proposal is to publish a green or white paper 
or a draft bill, and to take the comments and concerns raised in the process of 
consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny into account in the legislation that follows 
(para 179).
120.  Meeting with the Lord Chief Justice and the Lord Chancellor (Ninth Report) (HL 
Paper 97) 
None.
121.  Money Bills and Commons Financial Privilege (Tenth Report) (HL Paper 97) 
None.
122.  Meeting with Lord Jay of Ewelme, Chairman (Eleventh Report) (HL Paper 104) 
None.
123.  The Cabinet Manual (Twelfth Report) (HL Paper 107) 
None.
124.  European Union Bill (Thirteenth Report) (HL Paper 121) 
Laws should aim to avoid complexity that will hinder transparency and accessibility 
in the law (para 27). 
 Referendums should only be used to decide fundamental constitutional issues (para 
38). 
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 Laws should respect the fundamental constitutional principle that no Parliament may 
bind its successors (para 44).
125.  Part 1 of the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill (Fourteenth Report) (HL 
Paper 143) 
Laws should not jeopardise the operational independence of the police (para 4).
 The Government should explain their position on post-legislative scrutiny of the Bill 
prior to its enactment (para 19).
126.  The Process of Constitutional Change (Fifteenth Report) (HL Paper 177) 
When the Government introduces a Bill it should provide a written ministerial 
statement which indicates whether, in each minister’s view, the bill provides for 
significant	constitutional	change	and,	if	so:
 –    what is the impact of the proposals upon the existing constitutional 
arrangements;
 –    whether and, if so, how the government engaged with the public in the initial 
development of the policy proposals and what was the outcome of that public 
engagement;
 –    in what way were the detailed policies contained in the bill subjected to rigorous 
scrutiny in the Cabinet committee system;
 –    whether a green paper was published, what consultation took place on the 
proposals, including with the devolved institutions, and the extent to which the 
government agree or disagree with the responses given;
 –    whether a white paper was published and whether pre-legislative scrutiny was 
undertaken and the extent to which the government agree or disagree with the 
outcome of that process;
	 –				what	is	the	justification	for	any	referendum	held,	or	to	be	held,	on	the	proposals;	
 –    and when and how the legislation, if passed, will be subject to post-legislative 
scrutiny (para 71-72). 
	 Significant	constitutional	legislation	should	be	subject	to	pre-legislative	scrutiny	
(para 95) 
 The parliamentary scrutiny of constitutional bills should not be rushed unless there 
are	justifiable	reasons	for	fast-tracking	them	(para	99).
 Constitutional legislation should not be passed during the wash-up (para 99).
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 Constitutional legislation should be subject to comprehensive post-legislative 
scrutiny (para 104).
 If the Constitution Committee reports on a bill before second reading, the 
Government should respond before the commencement of the committee stage 
(para 114). 
127.  Police (Detention and Bail) Bill (Sixteenth Report) (HL Paper 178) 
The explanatory notes to a fast-tracked Bill should explain the reasons the departing 
from the normal parliamentary procedure (para 5). 
 Parliament should be given adequate time to consider a Bill that raises questions of 
constitutional principle (para 7).
128.  Scotland Bill (Seventeenth Report) (HL Paper 184) 
None.
129.  The Health and Social Care Bill (Eighteenth Report) (HL Paper 197) 
Laws should not risk or impair the principle of individual ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament (para 18).
 A minister’s legal accountability to the courts should not be fragmented (para 18).
130.  Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill (Nineteenth Report)  
(HL Paper 198) 
 Laws which increases the power of the executive over the liberty of the individual 
should be subject to adequate safeguards (para 13).
	 The	explanatory	notes	are	not	the	appropriate	location	for	constitutionally	significant	
directions to the courts, such matters should be clear from the face of the Bill (para 
17).
131.  Protection of Freedoms Bill (Twentieth Report) (HL Paper 215) 
Henry VIII clauses should be drafted as narrowly as possible (para 8). 
 Ministerial assurances as to the purpose of order-making powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill (para 10).
132.  Part 1 of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill (Twenty-First 
Report) (HL Report 222)  
Laws should not interfere with the constitutional right of access to justice (para 5). 
 Restrictions upon the constitutional right of access to justice should be proportionate 
(para 6). 
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 Laws should not interfere with the right of an individual detained in a police station to 
free legal advice (paras 18-19).
133.  Health and Social Care Bill: Follow-up (Twenty-Second Report) (HL Paper 240) 
Laws should not risk or impair the principle of individual ministerial responsibility to 
Parliament (para 1). 
 A minister’s legal accountability to the courts should not be fragmented (para 1).
134.  Voting at the Close of Poll (Twenty-Third Report) (HL Paper 245) 
None. 
135.  Referendum on Scottish Independence (Twenty-Third Report) (HL Paper 263) 
None.
136.  Judicial Appointments (Twenty-Fourth Report) (HL Paper 272) 
None.
11. 2012-2013
137.  Sessional Report (First Report) (HL Paper 16) 
None.
138.  Crime and Courts Bill (Second Report) (HL Paper 17)  
The use of Henry VIII powers should only be contemplated where a full and clear 
explanation	and	justification	is	provided	(para	6).
	 The	use	of	Henry	VIII	powers	should	only	be	permitted	if	specific	purposes	are	
provided for in the Bill, and, if there are adequate procedural safeguards (para 6).
 Primary legislation is the appropriate vehicle for constitutionally sensitive subject 
matter (para 7).
 The politicisation of the judicial appointments process should be avoided (para 16).
139.  Justice and Security Bill (Third Report) (HL Paper 18) 
Legislation should only depart from the principles of open justice and natural justice 
when it can be demonstrated on the basis of clear evidence that it is necessary 
(para 10).
 The executive should not be allowed to have the dual role in civil proceedings of 
being a party to the litigation and at the same time being the sole “gatekeeper”, 
controlling access to the possibility that the litigation be conducted in a certain 
manner(para 18).
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 Interference with the courts’ ability to decide on the appropriate balance between 
the competing public interests of national security and the proper administration of 
justice should be avoided (para 22). 
 Laws should not grant powers to the Secretary of State that unduly risk the fair 
administration of justice (para 28).
 Case management issues should be decided by the courts and not by Government 
ministers (para 31).
 Henry VIII powers that relate to a constitutionally sensitive subject-matter should 
use	a	super-affirmative	parliamentary	procedure	(para	32).
 Legislation that departs from principles of open justice and natural justice should be 
subject to post-legislative scrutiny (para 35).
140.  Justice and Security Bill [HL]: Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction (Fourth Report) (HL 
Paper 31)  
None. 
141.  Electoral Registration and Administration Bill (Fifth Report) (HL Paper 51) 
Bills that contain constitutional reform should be preceded by a white paper, public 
consultation and pre-legislative scrutiny (para 4).
 Legislative powers that permit the Secretary of State to affect a constitutionally 
important right should be subject to effective parliamentary scrutiny (para 13).
142.  The Agreement on a referendum on independence for Scotland (Sixth Report) (HL 
Paper 62) 
None.
143.  The accountability of civil servants (Seventh Report) (HL Paper 61) 
None.
144.  Police (Complaints and Conduct) Bill (Eighth Report) (HL Paper 80) 
When introducing a Bill that is to be fast-tracked, the responsible minister should 
explain fully why the fast-tracking is necessary, the explanatory notes should 
address the template of questions set out in the Constitution Committee’s report on 
fast-track legislation (para 4).140
 Fast-track legislation should not be used to address legal issues that have been 
known about for a long time (para 7).
 Fast-track legislation should be made available to Parliament’s legislative scrutiny 
committees at the earliest possible opportunity, even while the legislation remains in 
draft form (para 8).
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145.  Defamation Bill (Ninth Report) (HL Paper 86) 
A	Bill	which	contains	provisions	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	preceded	
by draft legislation, which was subject to public consultation and to pre-legislative 
scrutiny by a joint committee (para 6).
	 Rules	that	are	central	to	a	bill	of	constitutional	significance	should	be	to	the	greatest	
extent possible on the face of the bill, so allowing full legislative amendment and 
debate (para 15).
146.  Growth and Infrastructure Bill (Tenth Report) (HL Paper 104) 
Ministerial assurances as to the purpose of order-making powers are not a 
substitute for legal safeguards on the face of a Bill (para 10).
 The policy aims of a Ministerial power should be included in the Bill itself (para 10).
147.  The Succession to the Crown Bill (Eleventh Report) (HL Paper 106)
 When introducing a Bill that is to be fast-tracked, the responsible minister should 
explain fully why the fast-tracking is necessary, the explanatory notes should 
address the template of questions set out in the Constitution Committee’s report on 
fast-track legislation (para 13).141
 The fast-tracking of normal parliamentary procedure should only occur when strictly 
necessary (para 16). 
	 Bills	containing	constitutionally	significant	matters	should	not	be	subject	to	a	fast-
tracked parliamentary procedure (para 20).
148.  Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Bill (Twelfth Report) (HL Paper 155) 
When introducing a Bill that is to be fast-tracked, the responsible minister should 
explain fully why the fast-tracking is necessary, the explanatory notes should 
address the template of questions set out in the Constitution Committee’s report on 
fast-track legislation (para 5).
 Fast-track legislation should not be used to retrospectively overturn a court 
judgment in order to deprive an individual of a right (para 10). 
 Fast-track legislation should not be used to retrospectively overturn a court 
judgment where there is no compelling operational requirement to amend the law 
retrospectively (para 10).
 Individuals should not be punished or penalised for contravening what was at the 
time a valid legal requirement (para 13).
140 Constitution Committee, 15th report (2008–09): Fast-track legislation: constitutional implications and safeguards (HL Paper 
116), para 186.
141 Constitution Committee, 15th report (2008–09): Fast-track legislation: constitutional implications and safeguards (HL Paper 
116), para 186.
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149.  The pre-emption of Parliament (Thirteenth Report) (HL Paper 165) 
None. 
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